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Abstract 
 
This paper brings together data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, National 
Survey of Unions and TUC focus on recognition survey to investigate influences on union 
organising effectiveness.  Organising effectiveness is defined as the ability of trade unions to 
recruit and retain members.  Results suggest that there are big differences in organising 
effectiveness between unions, and that national union recruitment policies are an important 
influence on a union’s ability to get new recognition agreements.  However local factors are a 
more important influence on organising effectiveness in workplaces where unions have a 
membership presence.  There are also important differences in organising effectiveness among 
blue and white-collar employees.  These differences suggest that unions will face a strategic 
dilemma about the best way to appeal to the growing number of white-collar employees. 
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 Introduction 
 
Union membership in Britain fell continuously between 1979 and 1998.  This dramatic 
decline can be attributed to two direct causes.  First unions’ failure to gain a bargaining 
presence in newly established workplaces.  Second, declining union membership in 
workplaces where unions were recognised (Machin, 2000 and Millward et al., 2000).  The 
underlying causes of union membership change (and therefore of decline) are conventionally 
held to be:  1) macro economic conditions; 2) the composition of the workforce; 3) the legal 
and institutional framework laid down by the state; 4) industrial relations policies pursued by 
management and 5) the recruitment activity of unions themselves (Metcalf, 1991).  In other 
words, aggregate union membership is dependent upon both the environment that unions 
face, and the union response to that environment.  Empirical evidence from Britain found that 
unions did not respond adequately to the tough environment of the 1980’s (Kelly and Heery, 
1989).  Evidence from the USA suggests that the organisational configuration and strategies 
and tactics adopted by trade unions are important influences on aggregate union membership 
(Fiorito et al., 1995 and Bronfrenbrenner, 1997).  The aim of this paper is to investigate 
whether British unions are any nearer to finding an organisational and policy response that 
will enable them to boost aggregate membership. 
In this paper two sets of measures of union organising effectiveness are proposed.  
The first is based on a union’s ability to recruit workers in workplaces where they have an 
established presence (internal organising effectiveness).  The second is based on a union’s 
ability to organise non-union work places (external organising effectiveness).  The 
relationships between different organisational configurations, different strategies and these 
measures are examined.  This is done using information from the 1998 Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey (WERS98), Heery et al.’s National Survey of Unions (NSU, see Heery et 
al. 2000 for full details) and the TUC/Labour Research Department (LRD) survey on union 
recognition.  The use of these data sources to tackle questions of union institutional 
effectiveness represents a significant methodological development.  Previous attempts to 
measure the institutional effectiveness of trade unions have used case study methods (see for 
example Undy et al. 1981 and Greene et al., 1999).  Section One examines concepts and 
measures of union organising effectiveness.  Section Two considers factors likely to 
influence union organising effectiveness and puts forward some testable hypotheses.  Section 
Three considers the data and results for internal organising effectiveness.  Section Four
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considers the data and results for external organising effectiveness.  Section Five considers 
the practical implications of the results and Section Six offers some conclusions. 
 
 
1.  Organising Effectiveness:  Concepts and Measures 
 
Simply put, union organising effectiveness can be defined as a union’s ability to recruit and 
retain members (Fiorito et al. 1995).  This rests on two factors.  First, a union’s ability to get 
recognition agreements in workplaces currently without a union presence (external 
organising, or what Kelly and Heery (1989) call distant expansion).  Second, a union’s ability 
to recruit and retain members in workplaces where it already has a bargaining presence.  
Internal organising activity can be further divided between close consolidatory recruitment –  
mopping up members in bargaining units covered by collective bargaining.  Distant 
consolidatory recruitment – recruiting non-members in weakly organised workplaces covered 
by recognition agreements and close expansion – recruiting non-members not covered by 
union recognition in workplaces where some workers are covered by recognition (Kelly and 
Heery, 1989, p.198).  This is in line with Willman’s union growth and survival model, which 
identifies individual recruitment in recognised workplaces and individual recruitment in 
workplace without recognition of two of the four possible routes to union growth (Willman, 
1989).  More recently, Willman has argued that ‘bargaining units’ are important units for 
analysing trade union behaviour.  A workplace can have more than one bargaining unit, 
bargaining units reflect the different occupational groups in the workplace (Willman, 2001).  
These theoretical insights can be combined into a model of the dimensions of trade union 
organising and recruitment activity.  This model is set out in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1- The dimensions of trade union organising and recruitment 
 
 
Workplace A       Workplace B     Workplace C 
 
 
 
  Management  
 
 
 
 
  Management support 
 
 
  Technical 
 
 
 Core workgroup 
 
 
     Vertical 
     (Internal)  
         O & R 
 
 
 
   
Ancillary jobs 
 
     
     Horizontal (External) O & R 
 
     
Workgroup covered by union recognition     Workgroup with no union members or recognition 
 
 Workgroup with union members, but no collective recognition  In-fill potential 
4 
A union has recognition and membership among the largest occupational group in 
workplace A.  It also has some members, but no recognition agreements in two of the other 
occupational/workgroups in the workplace.  It has a small number of members, but no 
recognition agreement in workplace B, and no members or recognition in workplace C.  The 
union can therefore organise and recruit in up to three ways:  1) infill recruitment among the 
non-members currently covered by union recognition in workplace A;  2) recruit and attempt 
to get recognition among the non-members in non-recognised groups in workplace A; 3) 
recruitment, with the aim of getting recognition among employees in the core workgroup at 
workplaces B and C.  A fourth way of recruiting in the non-core occupational groups in 
workplaces B and C is also possible, but unlikely because the union has little experience of 
organising non-core workgroups.  The possible permutations would become more complex if 
another union was introduced to the model.  Willman would predict that the union will focus 
on infill recruitment in the core workgroup (because to do so would increase bargaining 
power) and organising the core workgroups in workplaces B and C (because the payoff to 
organising will be highest, Willman, 2001).  However case study evidence suggests that 
unions tend to be more opportunistic in the selection of organising and recruitment campaign 
targets so may be more likely to concentrate on areas where they already have members 
(Kelly and Heery, 1989).   
From this model, several measures of internal and external organising effectiveness 
can be developed.  First three measures of internal organising effectiveness:  1) the 
probability of a worker in a core workgroup covered by recognition being a union member; 
2) the probability of any worker in an occupational group with union members being a union 
member; 3) the probability of any worker in a workplace with a union presence being a union 
member.  External organising effectiveness can be measured by looking at:  1) the number of 
new recognition agreements won by a particular union, the number of new members recruited 
through these agreements; 2) the number of workers covered by new agreements.  However, 
it is important to take into account the effect of union size.  If a large union and a small union 
both organise the same number of non-union workers, the smaller union will be the more 
effective because it has organised the greater number of workers proportionate to its size and 
resources.  If we take this into account, a better measure of external organising effectiveness 
would be new members divided by current members, or the new number covered by union 
recognition divided by the number previously covered.   
Between 1979 and 2000, a hostile legal and economic environment made it difficult 
for unions to successfully pursue external organising campaigns without the explicit 
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endorsement of the employer.  The ‘climate’ of the period ensured that the majority of 
employers were hostile.  The result was that unions failed to get recognition agreements in 
newly established workplaces.  This factor was a key cause of the overall decline in union 
membership (Machin, 2000).  The statutory trade union recognition procedure in the 1999 
Employment Relations Act gives trade unions the right to be recognised if they can 
demonstrate majority support among the workforce (Wood and Goddard, 1999).  Despite the 
new statutory recognition procedure, New Labour has left unchallenged key elements of the 
‘neo-liberal environment’ created by the Conservatives.  The state no longer underwrites 
union survival, and trade unions cannot expect their fortunes to improve with a change in 
government.  Leading managers and the state share the assumption that trade unions will not 
have a major role in macro-economic management.  The trade union role in the workplace is 
contingent upon the majority support of the workforce and partnership between employers 
and employees is as legitimate as partnership between unions and employers (Boxall and 
Haynes, 1997, p.568).   
The opportunities for expansion provided by the statutory recognition procedure 
coupled with the realisation that without new recognition agreements unions will die has led 
to increased external organising activity (TUC, 2001).  Will this new activity prove more 
successful than previous union recruitment initiatives?  Evidence from the 1998 Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey shows that the proportion of workers in unionised workplaces 
who are union members fell between 1990 and 1998 (Millward et al., 2000).  This suggests 
that internal organising effectiveness is declining.  From a policy perspective, the interesting 
question is:  Can unions systematically affect their organising effectiveness, or are 
environmental factors beyond the union’s control more important?  
 
 
2.  Influences on Union Organising Effectiveness 
 
Many factors that influence organising effectiveness are beyond the power of unions to 
control.  However, unions are able to control their responses to the circumstances in which 
they find themselves.  This section will investigate union’s responses to their environment – 
union organisational configuration, policy and strategy at a national and local level, and the 
way in which these factors might influence union organising effectiveness. 
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Trade unions are governed by their rulebooks.  Most trade union rulebooks set out the 
industries and occupations that the trade union organises.  For example the Communication 
Workers Union (CWU) rulebook begins with a mission statement, which says that “The 
CWU exists to protect, advance and serve the interests of its members throughout the 
communications industry….  In pursuit of its aims, the Union will seek to expand Trade 
Union membership throughout the Communications Industry” (CWU, 2001).  These rules are 
supplemented by policies passed by union conferences which set more specific targets, for 
example committing a union to allocate a certain level of resources to organising and 
recruitment activity, or to targeting particular companies or organisations.  The union’s senior 
full-time officials and elected executive then have to translate these targets and aspirations 
into action.  Empirical research from the late 1980’s suggested that most British unions 
struggled to turn their organising aspirations into practice because full-time officials were 
reluctant to devote their time and resources to recruitment activity (Kelly and Heery, 1989).  
Since then continuing membership decline has forced unions to expend more energy and 
resources on attempting to improve on their previously dismal performance in this area.  
Training courses have been developed, recruitment budgets have been increased, and more 
dedicated organising officials have been hired (TUC, 2000b).   
The NSU contains a scale measuring the extent and sophistication of union organising 
and recruitment policies (the measures used are set out in table 1 below).  Fiorito et al. 
applied organisation theory to the concept of trade union organising effectiveness.  One of 
their key predictions was that a union’s efficiency and sophistication in managing organising 
and recruitment activity should result in increased organising effectiveness1 (Fiorito et al., 
1993).  Later empirical work confirmed this prediction (Fiorito et al., 1995).  Therefore a 
higher score on the NSU organising and recruitment policy scale should be associated with 
increased organising effectiveness. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Unions that demonstrate their commitment to organising and 
recruitment through a structure that prioritises these activities will score higher on 
measures of internal and external organising effectiveness. 
 
                                                 
1 Fiorito et al.’s other hypotheses were that innovation, democracy and decentralisation would be associated 
with increased organising effectiveness.  Innovation is discussed in the following paragraph, but unfortunately 
data is not available that would allow the democracy and decentralisation hypotheses to be tested among British 
unions.   
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Unions that don’t innovate are failing to respond to the challenges of a changing 
environment, consequently they will be less effective at organising (Fiorito et al., 1993).  The 
NSU contains a measure of innovation in organising and recruitment policy only (the details 
of this measure are set out in Table 2).  Following Fiorito et al.’s theoretical analysis the NSU 
innovation measure should be positively associated with organising effectiveness.  However 
while this measure captures some innovation in organising techniques for example 
sponsorship of TUC Organising Academy trainees it misses others, for example the adoption 
of US ‘organising model’ methods like house calls.  Neither does it capture the wider 
dimensions of management and campaigning innovation.  So the measure may not be strong 
enough to cause an effect.  Alternatively, we may find that unions with low innovation scores 
are more effective at organising because they are operating in stable environments so don’t 
need to innovate.  If so the relationship with internal organising effectiveness will actually be 
negative. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Innovation in organising and recruitment policy and practice will 
be positively associated with organising effectiveness. 
 
There are three markets for trade unionism, employees and employers and the state2.  
In the current neo-liberal environment the state is not buying.  Therefore a union can seek 
employer support, the support of the non-union workforce, or both.  A union that has the 
support of neither employers nor employees will die (Boxall and Haynes, 1997).  In practice 
this means that a union can either recruit the majority of the workforce in a non-union plant, 
then use that support to force the employer to grant recognition.  Or reach an agreement with 
the employer first by persuading them that union recognition is an effective and efficient way 
of managing personnel issues, then recruiting among the workforce with the employers 
blessing or acquiescence (Willman, 1989).  In the United States, high levels of employer 
hostility towards unions means that the employer market is closed to unions, so they must 
rely on the support of employees (Kleiner, 2000).   
Research by Kate Bronfrenbrenner (1997) suggests that the use of ‘organising model’ 
strategy and tactics increases the probability of success in union recognition elections.  This 
finding suggests that British unions that face hostile employers will be more successful if 
they employ organising model tactics.  However, evidence suggests that British employers 
                                                 
2 This is an adaptation of Willman’s argument that there are two markets for unions, employers and employees. 
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are generally less hostile to trade unions than American employers (Gall and McKay, 2001).  
There may therefore be cases where unions are able to persuade employers to grant them 
recognition and access to recruit the workforce without the union first demonstrating majority 
support.  Evidence collected by the TUC supports this contention (TUC, 2001).  Union 
policies of partnership and co-operation may make employers more willing to grant 
recognition voluntarily.  If unions adopt both the organising model and the partnership 
model, and are pragmatic in which they apply, they should be more effective at organising 
than unions that only adopt one of the models, or adopt neither.  One major caveat needs to 
be added to this prediction.  The highly decentralised nature of British trade unions means 
that the formal adoption of either organising or partnership by a union is unlikely to filter 
down and change behaviour of lay activists in the workplace in the short-term.  As both 
Organising and Partnership are relatively novel innovations, the prediction is unlikely to 
apply to internal organising effectiveness.  At local level lay union activists are more likely to 
adopt strategies that fit the local circumstances (Fairbrother, 2000). 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Unions that have adopted both the organising and partnership 
models will be more effective at external organising than unions that have adopted one 
or neither. 
 
Local union organisation and strategy is likely to be a very important influence on 
internal organising effectiveness.  National unions can influence local union organisation and 
strategy through the support and training which they provide to lay reps in the workplace.  
However the nature of this support is likely to vary within unions as much as it varies 
between unions, reflecting social relations and work organisation at the point of production 
(Fairbrother, 2000), the values and attitudes of the full-time officials and union activists 
involved (Kelly and Heery, 1994), and the strategic value of the bargaining unit to the union 
(Willman, 2001).  Unions will be more effective if they are run democratically because 
democracy makes the leadership more responsive to the preferences of members.  If a union 
responds to the preferences of members they are more likely to stay in membership than if the 
union ignores their wishes (Fiorito et al., 1993).  The same is likely to be true for unions in 
the workplace.  Indeed proponents of the union renewal hypothesis argue that local leadership 
accountability to the rank and file is an essential perquisite for union renewal (Fairbrother, 
2000).   
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Hypothesis 4:  There will be higher levels of internal organising effectiveness in 
workplaces where the senior union rep is elected compared to workplaces where the rep 
volunteers, or is chosen by the union or by management. 
 
A second prerequisite of union renewal is the recruitment of new generations of 
activists because union activists provide the organisational means to face new challenges 
(Fairbrother, 2000, p.19).  In practical terms this means that union activists recruit new 
members, and mobilise existing members to resist management demands.  The most practical 
expression of activism is to become a shop steward or union rep.  We would therefore expect 
internal organising effectiveness to be higher in workplaces with a higher number of reps 
relative to the total workforce.  A large number of union reps may also be a practical 
demonstration of management support for workplace trade unionism and collective 
bargaining.   
 
Hypothesis 5:  The greater the number of union reps relative to the size of the 
workforce, the greater will be internal organising effectiveness. 
 
A fierce debate is currently raging within academic circles on the question of whether 
militancy or co-operation is the more effective strategy for trade unions.  John Kelly has 
argued that militant workplace trade unionism is the only effective strategy because 
cooperation will only result in union demobilisation, leading ultimately to marginalisation 
and collapse (Kelly, 1998).  The counter argument is that militancy will lead to fierce 
employer counter mobilisation, which is likely to be successful given the current economic 
and political conditions.  Instead unions should focus on developing co-operation with 
management so both can secure ‘mutual gains’ (Bacon and Storey, 1996).  If workers vote 
with their feet and Kelly is correct, union membership should be higher in workplaces where 
unions follow policies of militancy.  If Bacon and Storey are correct, then membership should 
be higher in workplaces where unions co-operate with management.  The concepts of 
militancy and cooperation can be operationalised by looking at the role that the workplace 
union plays in the management of change.3.  If the union has no role, it is indicative of 
marginalisation of the union by management (although sadly we can’t identify whether 
marginalisation was a result of policies of militancy or co-operation). 
                                                 
3 I am indebted to Neil Millward for suggesting this measure. 
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Hypothesis 6:  Internal organising effectiveness will be higher in workplaces 
where the union is militant, compared to workplaces where the union is co-operative 
and workplaces where the union is marginalized. 
 
 
3.  Internal Organising Effectiveness:  Data and Results 
 
Internal organising effectiveness can be measured by looking at the probabilities of union 
membership for individuals in workplaces with a trade union presence.  If the individual has a 
high probability of membership, the union will be highly effective at internal organising.  If 
the individual’s probability of membership is low, the union is ineffective.  Once union 
effectiveness has been established, further information about union organisational 
configuration and policy can be added in order to test the propositions set out above.  To get 
realistic estimates of the effect of national union organisational configuration and policy on 
organising effectiveness it is necessary to control for the effect of local union organisation 
and environmental and individual characteristics.  This analysis can be performed using the 
1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey and the National Survey of Unions.  The 
sections below explain how this was done, the limitations of the methodology, and the 
results. 
 
3.1 Data 
 
The 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey gives a large sample of individual 
employees, with information on jobs, individual characteristics and union membership.  This 
information can be linked to detailed information about the individuals’ workplaces provided 
by the manager responsible for employee relations, and in some cases the senior employee 
representative.  The data was split according to the occupation of the individual, separate 
analyses were performed for individuals in blue-collar occupations (craft and related, 
operative and assemble and routine unskilled SOC groups) and white-collar occupations 
(managerial, professional, technical, clerical, sales and personal and protective services 
occupations).  This split reflects the significantly different experiences of the labour process 
at the point of production of the two broad occupational groups, which leads to different 
patterns of unionisation.  A difference confirmed by previous empirical studies of individual 
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unionisation (see for example Green, 1990 and Bain and Elias, 1985).  Individuals are not 
asked which union they are or are not a member of.  This information can be extrapolated 
from information provided by management and employee reps.  Consequently, problems of 
measurement arise, particularly in workplaces with more than one union (a full discussion of 
these problems can be found in the technical appendix).   
Six different empirical models were estimated on different sub samples of the data.  
Selection of sub samples reflected different measures of internal effectiveness and difficulties 
in identifying the union an individual employee would be eligible to join in multi-union 
workplaces.  Details of the sub samples used in different models are set out in Table 1.   
The sample used in models 1 and 3 includes any worker covered by any union 
representation, so offers a broad measure of internal organising effectiveness.  The sample 
used in models 2 and 4 gives a narrower measure, looking at effectiveness at consolidatory 
recruitment only.  Descriptive statistics in Table A2 give an indication of the differences 
between single union and multi-union workplaces.   
WERS98 does not contain information on national union organisational configuration, 
policy and strategy.  Fortunately this information is available in Heery et al’s National 
Survey of Unions.  This was a postal questionnaire completed by 67 per cent of British Trade 
Unions.  The results contain information on union structure and policy.  Specifically, to what 
extent does the union have a set of policies, practices and organisational supports for 
organising and recruitment work?  Do these policies and practices represent innovation, or 
are they of long standing?  Does the union follow policies of partnership or organising?  For 
the purposes of this analysis, the NSU commitment to recruitment scale and recruitment 
innovation scale were added into the WERS98 data.  The WERS98 data furnished measures 
of local union organisation and strategy and controls for environmental and individual 
characteristics.  Details of all the measures used in the analysis are set out in Table 2. 
 
Caveats 
 
First, it is important to note that because the analysis to follow uses cross-section data, it can 
only reveal statistical associations, not causal relationships.  Second, the results only tell us a 
limited amount about internal organising effectiveness in multi union workplaces.  Third, 
they only cover those unions that appear in both the WERS sample and the NSU.  Fourth, the 
small numbers of observations from workers in workplaces covered by some of the smaller 
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unions is likely to mean that the results reported for these smaller unions are unlikely to give 
a fair indication of that union’s internal organising effectiveness.   
 
3.2 Results and discussion 
 
Results of multivariate analyses are reported in Table 2.  The data was weighted so results are 
representative of the population from which the sample was drawn.  The reported results can 
be interpreted as the change in an individual’s probability of being a union member; the 
individual’s original probability of union membership is approximately equal to the sample 
mean.  Full details of the results, the modelling procedure, descriptive statistics and cross-
tabulations can be found in the technical appendix. 
At this stage the NSU scales on organising and recruitment policy and innovation 
were not included in the models.  The results show quite clearly that there are large and 
significant differences in internal organising effectiveness between different unions.  These 
differences are most distinct among blue-collar workers in single union workplaces, and least 
distinct among blue-collar workers in multi-union workplaces.  There are also variations in 
the size of the differences between the sample covering all occupational groups with union 
members (models 1 and 4) and the sample covering individuals covered by collective 
bargaining over pay only (models 2 and 5).  This variation may be due to differences in the 
openness of the union to members from outside of the core occupational groups/ bargaining 
units.  If a union attempts to recruit members outside of its core areas, and membership levels 
are lower among the non-core groups, then they will appear less effective than a union that 
recruits among the core groups only.  Models 2 and 4 get around this problem by focusing on 
employees in the unions core areas only, therefore discussion of the results will focus on 
these models.   
 
Blue-collar union results 
 
In the model 2 results, using the TGWU as the reference union, a blue-collar employee in a 
single union workplace organised by the AEEU is 29 per cent less likely to be a union 
member.  The same worker would be 30 per cent less likely to be a member if the workplace 
was organised by the GMB.  The figure for UNISON is 20 per cent, although this result is not 
statistically significant.  It should be noted that the UNISON result is highly sensitive to the 
inclusion of a control for the public sector.  If this control is removed the UNISON result 
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becomes positive.  The reason for this is that all but one of the UNISON workplaces is in the 
public sector, and organising effectiveness is particularly low in the single private sector 
workplace.  Results are also negative and statistically significant for the RMT, and negative 
but smaller and not significant for the GPMU, BFAWU and USDAW.  Looking at the model 
3 results for multi-union workplaces, the differences between the unions are smaller, and not 
statistically significant.  Two possible explanations for the difference between single and 
multi union workplaces suggest themselves.  First, a combination of inter-union co-operation 
and competition smoothes out the differences between unions.  Second, bargaining units in 
multi-union workplaces may be more strategically important unions than bargaining units in 
single union workplaces.  Multi union workplaces are larger on average than single union 
workplaces, they are also more likely to be part of multi-site organisations, both factors 
which would increase the strategic importance of the bargaining unit to the national union.  A 
third possible explanation, that the different results reflect differences between workers in the 
same occupational group as the senior union rep and the rest of the unionised workforce can 
be rejected, because the differences endure even if the single union workplaces sample 
consists of employees in the same occupational group as the senior union rep. 
 
White-collar union results 
 
Although there are some quite large variations between unions’ performance in model 5, with 
one exception (the NUT) these results are not statistically significant.  The NUT result, and a 
similar result in model 6 for both the NUT and the EIS may be due to the occupation of the 
employees that these unions organise (teachers) rather than union characteristics.   
In order to test hypotheses one and two a second set of models were estimated using 
the union’s score on the two NSU scales.  The abridged results are set out in Table 4.   
There is a small positive and (just about) statistically significant relationship between 
a sophisticated recruitment policy and organising effectiveness in models 1a (blue-collar 
workers in occupational groups with union members, but not necessarily covered by 
collective bargaining) and 6a (white-collar workers in multi-union workplaces).  In model 2a 
(blue-collar workers covered by collective bargaining), innovation is relatively more 
important.  Innovation is associated with being less effective at internal organising among 
white-collar workers.  This is likely to be because the most effective unions (the teaching 
unions and the FBU) don’t need to innovate because they are well adapted to a fairly static 
environment.  These findings do not provide ringing support for the hypotheses.  However 
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they do suggest that among some groups of workers, specifically blue-collar workers covered 
by collective bargaining, national union recruitment policy, and innovation in recruitment 
policy both increase internal organising effectiveness. 
 
Local union influences on internal organising effectiveness 
 
Results looking at the association between local union structure and behaviour are reported in 
Table 3.  The fourth hypothesis was that democratically elected reps would be associated 
with higher levels of organising effectiveness.  Among blue-collar workers in single union 
workplaces, internal organising effectiveness is positively associated with democratically 
elected reps, and the association is statistically significant.  However among blue-collar 
workers in multi-union workplaces, there is little difference in organising effectiveness 
between workplaces where the rep is democratically elected, and where the rep volunteered.  
The most startling results are found among white-collar employees.  Here organising 
effectiveness is higher in workplaces where management appoints the union rep.  This 
suggests that democracy and participation is less important to white-collar workers than the 
representative and insurance functions that workplace reps provide.  It also suggests that there 
is a significant body of the white-collar workforce who find unions unappealing unless the 
independence of the union from management is compromised.  These results provide a 
qualified endorsement for hypothesis four; democratic workplace unions do improve 
organising effectiveness, but only among blue-collar workers in single union workplaces.   
 The second measure of workplace union organisation, which might be expected to 
improve internal organising effectiveness, is the number of union reps relative to the size of 
the workforce.  Among blue-collar employees in single union workplaces, a one standard 
deviation increase in the number of reps relative to the size of the workforce increases an 
individual workers probability of being a union member by around 7 per cent.  In practical 
terms, among workers who are covered by collective bargaining, this means that an increase 
in reps from one rep per 44 employees to one rep per 33 employees would increase an 
individual’s probability of union membership from .68 to .72.  However an increase in the 
number of reps is not associated with increased organising effectiveness among blue-collar 
workers in multi-union workplaces.  Among white-collar workers in single union workplaces, 
an increase in the number of reps did not increase organising effectiveness.  Among white-
collar employees in multi-union workplaces, an increase in the number of reps from one per 
36 workers to one per 34 workers, increases an individuals probability of being a union 
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member from .71 to .74.  Once again there is qualified support for the hypothesis that 
increasing the number of union reps increases internal organising effectiveness. 
 The final hypothesis was that union militancy would be associated with increased 
internal organising effectiveness.  The results show that among blue-collar employees, 
policies of militancy are associated with very high levels of union membership.  However the 
proportion of workplaces pursuing policies of militancy was low (just 10 per cent of blue-
collar employees in single union workplace have unions which follow militant policies).  
Militant behaviour is also associated with increased union membership among white-collar 
employees, but the size of the effect is less, and the result is only statistically significant for 
workers in multi-union workplaces.  Cooperation with management is also associated with 
increased organising effectiveness compared to workplaces where unions are marginalised.  
The effect is largest among blue-collar workers in single union workplaces.  Overall these 
results provide some support for advocates of militancy and advocates of union-management 
co-operation, although union membership is at its highest among blue-collar workers when 
unions pursue militant policies.   
 To conclude this section, there are large differences between the internal organising 
effectiveness of different trade unions.  Some, but by no means all of these differences can be 
accounted for by variation in recruitment policies and innovation.  Unions that score highly 
on the NSU recruitment policy scale and recruitment policy innovation scale are more 
effective at organising blue-collar employees in single union workplaces.  By far the biggest 
influences on internal organising effectiveness are what the local union (and management) 
does in the workplace.  Among blue-collar employees in single union workplaces, and white-
collar employees in multi-union workplaces, a higher number of reps are associated with 
increased organising effectiveness.  Among blue-collar employees, democratic union 
organisation is more effective than non-democratic union organisation, but among white-
collar employees, democracy makes little difference.  If unions are able to engage with 
management, either militantly or cooperatively membership will be higher than if 
management marginalises the union. 
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4.  External Organising Effectiveness:  Data and Results 
 
4.1 Data 
 
Data to assess external union effectiveness comes from the publicly available ‘Focus on 
Union Recognition’ reports published annually by the TUC (TUC 1999a and TUC 2000a).  
Figures from the 1999 report, which covers the period from February to November 1998, and 
the 2000 report, which covers the period from January to October 1999 are used.  Figures 
from two years are used because agreements signed in 1999 are likely to reflect organising 
activity (hence organising effectiveness) in 1998.  Also because more unions signed new 
agreements over the two-year period than in a single year, the 1998 figures alone would not 
allow multivariate analysis of the results.  From this information two measures of organising 
effectiveness can be developed.  First, the number of new recognition agreements signed by 
each union, second, the number of workers covered by new agreements.  The reports do not 
tell us about the number of new members generated by the recognition campaign and 
agreement.  Organising effectiveness depends on the number organised compared to the 
number of those currently organised by the union concerned.  Unfortunately information on 
the numbers of workers covered by agreements negotiated by each union is not available.  
Current union membership is used as a second best proxy for this.  Therefore the second 
measure of external organising effectiveness is the total number covered by new agreements, 
divided by current union membership, from the 1998 union membership figures published by 
the TUC.   
Information on union organising and recruitment policy, innovation and strategy from 
the NSU were then added to this data.  The measures of organising and recruitment policy 
and innovation have already been set out in Table 2.  Partnership was measured by the 
presence of a formal union policy in favour of social partnership.  Organising was measured 
by the use of three or more ‘organising model messages’ in recruitment activity4.  Organising 
effectiveness also depends on the level of desire for union representation on the part of the 
workers organised.  It is much easier to get new agreements if the level of latent demand for 
union representation is high.  For this reason an estimate of the level of latent demand among 
                                                 
4 Organising model messages were 1.  worker solidarity, 2.  need for members to solve own problems through 
workplace organisation, 3.  Opportunity to participate in union democracy, 4.  membership a democratic right, 
5.  need for justice and respect at work.  The organising model dummy variable was positive if a union used 3 or 
more of these messages.  The messages were used in addition to messages about the ‘bread and butter’ issues of 
better pay, representation and protection, which were used across the board. 
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the type of workers covered by the new agreements negotiated by each union was added to 
the data.  This measure was based upon responses to the question ‘if there were a trade union 
at your workplace, how likely or unlikely do you think that you would be to join it?’ in the 
1998 British Social Attitudes Survey. 
 
Caveats 
 
First, the usual caveat about cross-section data applies.  Second, it would have been desirable 
to include more detailed controls for the industry and composition of the workforce.  This 
was not possible because the data collected by the TUC is not sufficiently detailed to identify 
accurately the detailed industry sectors, occupations and personal characteristics of the 
workforces involved.  Third, there are question marks over the comprehensiveness of the 
‘survey on recognition’ figures.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that some unions may under 
report the number of agreements signed because their own internal communications systems 
do not collect the data efficiently.  Despite this limitation the survey on recognition is likely 
to be broadly indicative of the level of activity being undertaken by different unions.  Fourth, 
the measure of partnership is not ideal, anecdotal evidence suggests that the current vogue for 
partnership means that some unions have adopted partnership policies for mimetic reasons 
without really putting partnership into practice.  Meanwhile other unions, which follow 
partnership policies in practice, do not have formal policies because the term is politically 
unacceptable to the activists who make union policy.  Finally, the results of the multivariate 
analysis reported below should be treated with caution because of the low number of 
observations. 
 
4.2 Results and discussion 
 
Table 5 reports the number of new recognition agreements, the number of workers covered 
by these agreements, the total reported membership of the union in 1998, and the number 
covered by new agreements divided by total union membership in 1998.  These figures are 
reported by union for all unions covered by the NSU. 
28 unions reported no new agreements in the period covered by our data.  Of those 
unions that did sign new recognition agreements, the union at the bottom of the table is the 
National Union of Teachers, which signed just one agreement covering five employees.  At 
the top of the table is the Independent Union of Halifax Staff, which organised 6000 workers 
compared to an existing membership of 25,000, followed by the Bakers Union, organising 
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2500 workers from an existing membership of around 30,000 and Unison, which organised 
55,000 workers from an existing membership of around 1.3 million.  Looking at the number 
of agreements, 56 per cent of agreements were signed by just three unions, the TGWU, the 
GMB and the GPMU. 
Regression models were estimated using the number of agreements (models 8a and 
8b) and the number or workers organised divided by the unions existing membership (models 
7a and 7b) as the dependent variables.  Models 7a and 8a looked at the association between 
external effectiveness and union recruitment policies and innovation.  Models 7b and 8b 
looked at the association between external effectiveness and union strategy.  The results are 
reported in Table 6 (more information on the modelling procedure, with cross-tabulations and 
descriptive statistics can be found in the appendix). 
 First, a one standard deviation increase in the unions score on the organising and 
recruitment policies scale is associated with increased organising effectiveness using both 
measures.  However innovation is negatively associated with organising effectiveness, 
although the association is small and not statistically significant.  The first finding confirms 
hypothesis one, unions with higher scores on the NSU organising and recruitment policy 
scale are more effective at organising than unions with lower scores.  However the second 
finding does not support hypothesis two, there is very little relationship between innovation 
in recruitment and organising policy as it is measured in the NSU and external organising 
effectiveness.   
 Looking now at the impact of union policy, unions that follow a policy of organising 
or a policy of partnership exclusively, perform worse than unions that have adopted neither 
policy.  Unions that have adopted both policies perform much better than unions that have 
adopted one policy only (the result is statistically significant when looking at the number of 
new agreements, but not when looking at numbers organised relative to existing 
membership).  Unions that have adopted both policies perform better than unions that have 
adopted neither policy, but the difference is not that large, and it is not statistically 
significant.  These results support hypothesis three, but the support is not overwhelming.  
They suggest that policies of organising and partnership are additive, but the performance gap 
between unions that have adopted both policies and unions that have adopted neither is not 
that large, and that the policies are not necessarily the reason for the difference.   
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5.  Practical Implications 
 
The most striking finding in these results is that there are large differences in union 
organising effectiveness among blue-collar employees in occupational groups covered by 
collective bargaining.  Table 7 illustrates this point. 
The table shows the probabilities of union membership for an arbitrarily defined 
‘typical worker’ if the workplace union is varied, and all other factors are held constant.  The 
differences cannot be explained by the unions’ scores on the NSU recruitment policy and 
innovation scales alone.  There are several possible explanations for the difference.  First, the 
difference in performance may reflect differences in the way that unions manage their 
recruitment policies, and the leadership and vision with which they are implemented, 
although why Bill Morris (the TGWU’s general secretary) should be a more visionary and 
inspiring leader than Sir Ken Jackson (of the AEEU) or John Edmonds (of the GMB) is 
unclear.  Second, the difference may reflect different levels of democracy and de-
centralisation (Fiorito et al. argue that democracy and decentralisation cause greater 
organising effectiveness).   
Applying a rule of thumb to these concepts, the TGWU, has a de-centralised regional 
and trade group structure with traditions of lay member led bargaining and participative 
democracy (Undy et al., 1981; Fairbrother, 2000).  The GMB has moved from being a full-
time official dominated union, to putting greater emphasis on shop stewards, but key officials 
(particularly the regional secretaries) remain powerful (Fairbrother, 2000).  The AEEU (the 
result of a merger between the AEU and EETPU) has taken on the characteristics of the 
highly centralised and full-time officer dominated EETPU (Lloyd, 1990).  UNISON is also 
the result of a recent merger, blue-collar workers would have been part of NUPE, which was 
also a union dominated by full-time officials, although in contrast to the EETPU, NUPE 
officials led from the left, not the right (Haunch, 2001).  Finally, USDAW was and remains a 
union where command and control from full-time officials is the dominant organisational 
characteristic.   
Greater democracy and decentralisation may explain the exceptional performance of 
the TGWU5, but not the variations in the performance between the GMB and AEEU and 
USDAW and UNISON.  The GMB and AEEU both competed enthusiastically in ‘beauty 
                                                 
5 The TGWU have recently reformed its trade group structure, replacing many single industry trade groups with 
4 multi-industry trade groups.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may have led to less lay activis t control 
and a greater role for senior full-time officials, the effect of this change on organising effectiveness remains to 
be seen.   
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contests’ to sign single union recognition agreements with employees in the 1980s and 1990s 
(Lloyd, 1990, p.654).  Critics of these agreements questioned the independence of the unions 
from management, and case studies found a minimal union role and low levels of 
membership (Danford, 1998).  It is therefore entirely plausible that the enthusiasm of the 
AEEU and GMB for beauty contests has resulted in lower levels of organising effectiveness.   
A second striking finding is the large differences in the variables associated with 
organising effectiveness for the blue-collar and white-collar samples.  Among white-collar 
workers the returns on militancy and cooperation are comparatively less, and increasing the 
number of union reps relative to the size of the workforce is only associated with higher 
levels of organising effectiveness among white-collar workers in multi-union workplaces.  
Most startling of all is the fact organising effectiveness is higher in workplaces with a 
management appointed rep than in workplaces with democratically elected reps.  This 
suggests that there is a significant minority of white-collar workers who will only unionise if 
the union has explicit management approval.  It also suggests that for white-collar workers, 
the protection and insurance function of trade unions is more important than the collective 
action function.  The finding suggests that unions seeking to organise white-collar employees 
face a strategic dilemma.  Should they attempt to import and build on the traditional 
collective representation model, in the hope that if it works well it will result in higher levels 
of membership and self-sustaining bargaining units (which appears to be the case in multi-
union workplaces)?  Or should they accept that this model is not working well in a great 
number of cases, so seek to develop improved means of providing and selling individual 
insurance, representation and related services? 
 Finally, what do these results suggest that unions can do to boost organising 
effectiveness?  The TUC has argued that the key to reviving union membership is for unions 
to recruit more reps, and to provide better support for existing reps in order to strengthen 
workplace organisation (TUC, 1999b).  These results support the diagnosis that more reps 
will make a difference, although not in all circumstances.  The results also point to the critical 
importance of local union effectiveness, policies of co-operation and militancy are both likely 
to lead to increased union membership if the workplace union currently plays a marginal role 
(although in many circumstances management will define the union role).  The results also 
suggest that the sophistication of trade union organising and recruitment policies make a 
small positive difference to internal organising effectiveness, and a larger positive difference 
to external organising effectiveness.   
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6.  Conclusions 
 
This paper has investigated the influences on trade union organising effectiveness.  The use 
of the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, the National Survey of Unions, and the 
TUC focus on recognition survey to do this represents a significant methodological 
development.  Concepts of internal and external organising effectiveness were developed.  
Internal effectiveness looks at the ability of unions to recruit and organise workers in 
workplaces where unions have a membership presence.  External effectiveness looks at the 
unions’ ability to recruit and gain recognition in workplaces that are non-union.  Separate sets 
of analyses were performed to investigate the factors associated with internal and external 
organising effectiveness.  The results of these analyses are summarised in Table 8. 
The results suggest that the sophistication of trade union organising and recruitment 
policies are an important influence on union organising effectiveness, particularly external 
organising effectiveness.  However innovation in organising and recruitment is not associated 
with increased organising effectiveness.  The latter result contrasts with results of Fiorito et 
al., (1995) who found that innovation was correlated with organising effectiveness among US 
unions.  The difference in the findings may be because the measure of innovation used here is 
much narrower than that used by the US study.  Fiorito et al. also found that decentralisation 
and democracy were associated with increased organising effectiveness.  Democratic local 
union organisation is certainly strongly associated with internal organising effectiveness 
among blue-collar workers, and the exceptional performance of the TGWU among blue-
collar workers covered by collective bargaining may also be down to these factors.  However 
the results point to fundamentally different causes of internal organising effectiveness among 
white-collar workers.  This difference presents unions with a strategic dilemma.  Should they 
seek to apply the principles and practices of blue-collar unionism to white-collar workers, or 
should they attempt to develop new products and services designed to appeal to the growing 
white-collar workforce? 
 Policies of organising and partnership appear to have an additive effect on external 
organising effectiveness, however union performance is not dramatically improved when 
compared to unions that have adopted neither policy.  Caution is needed when interpreting 
these results because of doubts about the reliability of the measures.  Local union policies of 
co-operation and militancy both boost organising effectiveness; the membership returns to 
militancy are higher than the returns to co-operation, but the ability of unions to pursue 
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militant policies is likely to remain constrained by the neo-liberal environment.  Overall, the 
results suggest that unions can influence their own destiny; what unions do does influence 
organising effectiveness.  However perhaps the largest critical factor is likely to remain the 
decisions taken by management; whether to support or oppose union recognition, and once 
recognised, whether to work with unions, or to attempt to marginalise them.  This suggests 
that if union membership is to return to the levels of the 1970s, unions will need to secure a 
public policy framework which encourages employers to bargain with unions.
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Table 1 - summary of analyses 
 
Model Occupation Union coverage Structure of 
workplace 
unionism 
1 Blue-collar 
employees 
Management respondent says union members present 
among occupational group 
Single union 
2 Blue-collar 
employees 
Management respondent says occupational group has 
pay determined by collective bargaining or pay review 
body 
 
Single union 
3 Blue-collar 
employees 
Employees in same occupational group as the senior 
union rep in workplaces where an interview with the 
employee rep was completed 
Multi union 
4 White collar 
employees 
Management respondent says union members present 
among occupational group 
Single union 
5 White-collar 
employees 
Management respondent says occupational group has 
pay determined by collective bargaining or pay review 
body 
 
Single union 
6 White-collar 
employees 
Employees in same occupational group as the senior 
union rep in workplaces where an interview with the 
employee rep was completed 
Multi union 
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Table 2 - Definitions of variables used in the analysis of internal organising effectiveness 
 
Variable Definition 
Union structure  
Commitment to 
recruitment scale 
Standardised scores of union at workplace on the 13 item scale from the NSU (Alpha .86) 
the items were: 
Investment 
1. Annual recruitment budget 
2. Training in organising for FTO’s 
3. Training in organising for lay activists 
4. Sponsorship of a trainee organiser at the TUC’s organising academy 
Specialisation 
5. Executive sub-committee that oversees recruitment 
6. Senior official whose main responsibility is organising/ recruitment 
7. FTO’s who specialise in organising/ recruitment 
8. Lay representatives who specialise in organising/ recruitment 
Formal recruitment policy 
9. Written national policy 
10. National recruitment plan 
11. Recruitment plans at intermediate levels 
12. Recruitment plans at lowest levels 
13. Periodic and quantified review of success 
Recruitment 
innovation scale 
Standardised scores of union at workplace on the 13 item scale (alpha .88) items as the 
recruitment commitment scale, but if practice or policy was introduced in the last three years 
Union name Dummy variable for the union at the workplace, information from manager 
 Local union organisation 
Militancy Dummy variable, positive if management respondent says that introduction of changed failed 
because of union resistance 
Co-operation Dummy variable, positive if management respondent says that union either negotiated or was 
consulted in the successful introduction of change 
Democracy Dummy variables for senior union rep elected (either by members or other union reps), 
senior union rep not elected (e.g.  appointed, by default etc.) Information on senior rep 
missing, reference: no union rep.  Information from senior rep  
Number of reps The standarised scores of the number of reps divided by the number of employees.  
Information from manager 
 Individual characteristics  
Age Worker’s report of age, banded into 20-24, 25-29, 30-39, 40-49 and 50+ 
Gender Worker’s report of gender, male or female 
Ethnicity Worker’s report of ethnic origin, banded white and non-white 
Highest educational 
qualification 
Worker’s report of highest educational qualification, banded none, GCSE or equivalent, A 
level or equivalent, Higher education or equivalent, NVQ or equivalent 
Job characteristics  
Hours worked Worker’s report of number of hours per week usually worked, banded full-time (30 hours per 
week or more) and part-time (<30 hours per week) 
Temporary or fixed 
term contract 
Worker’s report of whether or not they are on a fixed term or temporary contract 
Job tenure Worker’s report of time in the present job, banded < 1 year, 1-2 years, 2-5 years, 5-10 years 
and >10 years 
Occupation Dummy variables for worker’s report of 1 digit standard occupational classification  
 Workplace characteristics  
Workplace size Manager’s report of number of employees at the workplace, banded 10-14, 25-99, 100 – 499 
and 500+ 
Workplace age Manager’s report of the number of years that workplace has been at its current address (plus 
previous address if it had moved) banded to workplace established before 1970, 1970 – 
1980, 1980 – 1990 and post 1990. 
Industry Managers report of 1 digit standard industrial classification of workplace 
Public sector Managers report of whether or not the workplace is in the public sector 
Product market 
competition 
Managers report of level of competition – does the organisation of which the workplace is 
part have no, few or many competitors? 
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Table 3 - Estimated marginal effects from probit analyses on individual union 
membership 
 
Independent Variable Blue-collar employees   white collar employees   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Sample mean 0.56 .68 .92 0.46 .54 .71 
Union (ref: TGWU – models 1 - 3 UNISON 
– models 4 - 6) 
      
AEEU -.18*** -0.29** .04 .06 .01  
UNISON -.27*** -.2  - -  
GMB -.05 -.3*** .07 .05 .04 .08 
TGWU -   .26* .08  
GPMU -.09 -.11  .01 -.19  
BIFU    .26* .22  
USDAW -.12 -.14  .11 .23  
RMT  .11 -.29**     
BFAWU -.01 -.13     
CWU   -.13    
IPMS    0 -.07  
AUT    -.1 -.17  
PCS    0.11* .09 .24 
MSF    .03 -.04  
NUT    .28** .26** .28*** 
NUIW    .24 .09  
EIS      .24*** 
FBU      .7 
NATFHE 
 
     .08 
Local union behaviour       
Cooperative (ref: neither co-operative or 
militant) 
.17*** .24*** .08* .09** .08 .08** 
Militant6   .13** .08 .15 .14** 
Local union organisation       
Senior union representative is elected (ref: 
no union representative models 1,2,4 and 5 
and rep volunteered models 3 and 6) 
.13** .25*** -.05 .22*** .22*** .07* 
Senior union representative chosen by 
management  
.05 - - .3*** .38*** .34 
Senior rep chosen by union -.09 -.25 -.06 .17** .1 .06 
Senior rep volunteered .11 .06  .18*** .17** - 
Ratio of employees to representatives 
 
.08** .06 -.02 .01 0 - 
Individual characteristics       
Age (ref Age under 20)       
Age 20 – 24 -.05 -.14 .09 .04 .05 -.3** 
Age 25 – 29 -.01 -.05 .12* .15*** .18** -.19 
Age 30 – 39 .03 .01 .04 .19*** .21*** -.22* 
Age 40 - 49 .01 .003 .05 .21*** .24*** -.23* 
Age 50+ .06 .05 .02 .18*** .21** -.3** 
Female (ref: male) .005 -.01 -.16*** 0 .02 -.03 
Ethnic minority .02 -.03 .01 -.02 -.01 -.06 
Highest educational qualification (ref: none)       
GCSE’s or equivalent  -.01 .05 .05 -.03 .02 -.08 
A Levels or equivalent .04 .03 .01 -.06 0 -.13** 
Degree or equivalent -.17 -.18 -.02 -.06 .02 -.09 
Job characteristics       
Part-time (<30 hours/ week) -.13 -.18** -.09* -.12*** -.18*** -.09 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Temporary or fixed term contract .08 .16** -.15*** -.14** -.13** -.15*** 
Job tenure (ref: <1 year)       
1 – 2 years .01 -.11 -.07 .02 .05 -.04 
2 – 5 years .15*** 0.01 -.01 .12*** .16*** -.07 
5 – 10 years .15*** .07 .1 .17*** .21*** .12*** 
10+ years 
 
.27*** .11 .11* .25*** .26*** .2*** 
Occupation (ref: Craft models 1 – 3) and 
managers models 4 – 6) 
      
                                                 
6 The militancy variable predicts union membership perfectly (i.e.  all employees in workplaces with militant 
unions were members) so observations with this characteristic were dropped from the regression. 
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managers models 4 – 6) 
Professional    -.05 -.01 .5*** 
Associate professional and technical    .09 .12 .67*** 
Clerical and Administrative    -.07 -.08 .43*** 
Personal services    .01 .01 .4*** 
Sales    -.02 .05 .58*** 
Operative and assembly -.08* .01 .14**    
Other unskilled manual 
 
-.13* .09 .14**    
Workplace characteristics       
Workplace size (ref: 10 – 14 employees)       
25 – 99 employees -.05 .06 -.04 -.27*** -.2*** .01 
100 – 499 employees .005 .04 -.01 -.36*** -.31*** -.04 
500+ employees -.13 -.35* .05 -.35*** -.22*** -.04 
Workplace age (ref: workplaces open before 
1970) 
      
Workplace opened between 1970 and 1979 .03 .12 -.1 -.01 0 .04 
Workplace opened between 1980 and 1989 .03 -.09 -.23 0 -.04 .06 
Workplace opened after 1990 .15 .13* -.02 .06 .08 .1** 
Product market competition (ref: many 
competitors) 
      
No competitors -.13 .24* -.23** -.05 -.01 .01 
Few competitors -.01 -.17** 0 .16*** .14** .06 
Information on level of competition missing .13** .22** -.05 .04 .03 .1** 
Public sector .45***  .14 .25*** .24*** -.04 
1 digit standard industrial classification (ref: 
manufacturing except model 6 where 
education is the reference category) 
      
Electricity generation and supply, water and 
gas supply 
.04 0 .15** .51** .38 .1 
Construction .19** .09 -.11 .3* .01  
Wholesale and retail .12* .09 .12 .32** .11 .07 
Hotels and restaurants .07 -.3***  .07 -.33*  
Transport and communications .07 -.15 .04 -.03 -.14 .07 
Financial services    .25* .08 .27 
Other business services -.06 .36*  .22* .07 -.11 
Public administration -.42 -.07 -.11 .25* .05 -.22 
Health and social services -.3 0.47  .25* .11 .04 
Other community services .09 .38***  .13 -.08 -.29*** 
Education    -.11 -.27 - 
n    2149 1432  
 
Notes 
1. *= significant at the 10% level, **= significant at the 5% level, ***= significant at the 1% level. 
2. Marginal effects calculated from coefficients in table A2. 
3. Estimation technique used was Survey probit analysis, which produces robust standard errors and accounts for the 
clustering of individuals in workplaces. 
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Table 4 - Impact of local and national union policies and structure on individual union 
membership 
 
Independent Variable Blue-collar employees   White collar employees   
 Model 
1a 
Model 
2a 
Model 
3a 
Model 
4a 
Model 
5a 
Model 
6a 
National Union       
Structures and policies for 
organising and recruitment 
.05* .05 0 .01 .02 .04*** 
Innovation in organising 
and recruitment 
 
0 .08 .04 -.06 -.08*** -.07*** 
 
Controls:  Local union role, mode of shop steward appointment, number of shop stewards relative to 
workforce, individual; age, occupation, highest educational qualification, gender, ethnicity.  Job 
characteristics; part time, temporary or fixed term contract, job tenure.  Workplace; size, date 
established, product market competition, public sector, industry. 
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Table 5 - Information on new recognition agreements 1998 – 1999 by union 
 
 
 
 
 
Number organised / 
number of members 
Number of workers 
organised 1998 – 1999 
Number of 
agreements1998 –
1999 
Total union  
members 1998 
ALGUS 0 0 0 3068 
ANSA 0 0 0 7468 
ASLEF* 0 0 0 14721 
ATL 0 0 0 113,760 
AUT 0 0 0 41,758 
BACM* 0 0 0 4289 
BALPA* 0 0 0 6555 
BOS* 0 0 0 1011 
Connect 0 0 0 16747 
CSP* 0 0 0 31351 
CWU 0 0 0 287732 
EQUITY* 0 0 0 36563 
EMA 0 0 0 28631 
FBU* 0 0 0 57654 
FDA 0 0 0 10627 
MPO 0 0 0 9627 
MU* 0 0 0 30811 
NACO* 0 0 0 3012 
NATFHE 0 0 0 64153 
NLBD* 0 0 0 2200 
NUDAGO 0 0 0 2253 
NULMW 0 0 0 4021 
PFA 0 0 0 2268 
RMT 0 0 0 56476 
UCATT* 0 0 0 111804 
TSSA 0 0 0 28940 
SoR* 0 0 0 13725 
WISA 0 0 0 5000 
NUT 0.000026 5 1 194259 
PCS 0.00059 150 1 254350 
USDAW 0.00066 200 1 303060 
NUJ 0.00113 22 2 19436 
NUMAST 0.00159 30 1 188843 
EIS 0.002 100 1 49994 
BECTU 0.00256 72 3 28128 
GPMU 0.00278 563 14 203229 
GMB 0.005556 3956 18 712010 
IPMS 0.005 370 3 73329 
MSF 0.00613 2600 5 423842 
TGWU 0.00654 5767 28 881625 
AEEU 0.008 5800 6 727977 
KFAT 0.0086 280 3 32624 
ISTC 0.0252 1260 3 50001 
UNISON*** 0.0434 55200 8 1272330 
BFAWU 0.0834 2500 4 29962 
IUHS** 0.234 6000 2 25652 
*= Information missing, so not included in the tobit analysis 
**= Outlier – Growth came through corporate takeovers by the parent company (Halifax building society), the company then 
extended the existing recognition agreements to cover the newly acquired workforce. Consequently the IUHS are not used in 
the tobit analysis 
*** - 55,000 of these came from a single agreement with Compass Group, a contract catering company with a large number 
of NHS contracts. 
 
Notes 
1. Data on the number of new agreements and number of workers covered comes from the publicly available ‘Focus on 
Recognition’ published by the TUC. The data used comes from the 1999 report (covering the period February – November 
1998) and the 2000 report (covering the period January – October 1999). 
 
2. Data on union membership comes from the TUC’s 1998 membership figures. 
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Table 6 - The impact of recruitment policy, innovation and strategy on external 
organising effectiveness 
 
Model   coefficient 
7A Dependent 
variable 
Standardised scores of the number of workers organised divided by 
the total membership 
 
 Independent 
variables 
Commitment to organising and recruitment scale  0.54** 
  Recruitment innovation scale -0.05 
  Latent demand  0.02* 
  Constant -0.128 
  _SE  0.57 
  Chi2 
Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo R2 
12 
0.002 
.28 
  N=33 (16 left censored observations) 
 
 
7B Dependent 
variable 
Standardised scores of the number of workers organised divided by 
the total membership 
 
 Independent 
variables 
Organising message -0.1 
  Partnership policy -0.34 
  Organising and Partnership interaction  0.7 
  Latent demand  0.02** 
  Constant -1.37 
  _SE 0.59 
  Chi2 11 
  Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo R2 
0.02 
.2 
  N=33 (16 left censored observations) 
 
  
8A Dependent 
variable 
Number of new agreements  
 Independent 
variables 
Commitment to organising and recruitment scale  5.5** 
  Recruitment innovation scale -1.4 
  Size of union  0.00001*** 
  Latent demand .13 
  Constant -9.8 
  _SE  6 
  Chi2 27 
  Prob> Chi2 
Pseudo R2 
0.0000 
.19 
  N=33 (18 left censored observations) 
 
 
8B Dependent 
variable 
Number of new agreements  
 Independent 
variables 
Organising message -4.2 
  Partnership policy -1.8 
  Organising and Partnership interaction  10.2* 
  Size of union  0.00001*** 
  Latent demand  0.18* 
  Constant -9. 
  _SE  5.5 
  Chi2  29 
  Prob> Chi2 0.0000 
.21 
  N=33 (18 left censored observations)  
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Table 7 - The national union effect on a typical worker’s probability of union 
membership 
 
Union Worker’s probability of union membership 
AEEU .73 
GMB .73 
TGWU .98 
UNISON .87 
USDAW .88 
Calculated from model 2 results 
 
Worker’s characteristics:  White male, aged under 30, no formal educational qualifications, 
works full-time on a permanent contract in a craft occupation.  Has been in the job for 2 – 5 
years.  Workplace characteristics:  Manufacturing workplace with 100 – 499 employees, 
established before 1970.  Workplace union characteristics:  The union co-operates with 
management, the senior union rep was democratically elected, and the number of reps 
relative to the size of the workforce is set to the sample mean. 
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Table 8 - Summary of results 
 
Model 
 
 
Sample Variables with statistically significant 
association with organising effectiveness 
(direction of association) 
 Internal Organising effectiveness  
Model 1 Blue collar employees in single union 
workplaces 
National union organising and recruitment 
policies and structure scale (+) 
 
Militancy (+) 
 
Cooperation (+) 
 
Democratically elected senior union rep (+) 
 
Increased number of union reps (+) 
Model 2 Blue collar employees covered by collective 
bargaining in single union workplaces 
Militancy (+) 
 
Cooperation (+) 
 
Democratically elected union rep (+) 
 
Union rep chosen by union (-) 
Model 3 Blue collar employees in the same 
occupational group as the senior union rep, 
multi union workplaces 
 
None 
Model 4 White collar employees in single union 
workplaces 
 
Any on site union representative (+) 
 
Model 5 White collar employees covered by collective 
bargaining or pay review body in single union 
workplaces 
Innovation in organising and recruitment 
policies scale (-) 
 
Any on site union representative (+) 
 
Model 6 White collar employees in the same 
occupational group as the senior union rep, 
multi union workplaces 
Organising and recruitment policies and 
structure scale (+) 
 
Innovation in organising and recruitment 
policies scale (-) 
 
Militancy 
 
Any on site representation (+) 
 
Increased number of union reps (+) 
 External organising effectiveness  
Model 7  Unions that responded to the NSU Organising and recruitment policies and 
structure scale (+) 
 
Model 8 Unions that responded to the NSU Organising and recruitment policies and 
structure scale (+) 
 
Use of organising and partnership models 
together (+) 
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Technical Appendix 
 
Modelling Procedures 
 
1.  Internal Organising Effectiveness 
 
Because the dependent variable (individual union membership) is categorical the appropriate 
method of analysis is probit analysis.  Both models are run using data weighted by the inverse 
of the individuals sampling probability.  This means that the results can be generalized to the 
population from which the sample is drawn.  It also prevents estimation bias caused by 
differential sample selection probabilities (Skinner, 1997).  The Huber-White robust variance 
estimator was used; this estimation method produces consistent standard errors in the 
presence of heteroscedasticity.  This procedure uses pseudo-likelihood methods, so the point 
estimates are from a weighted ‘likelihood,’ which is not the distribution function from the 
sample.  This means that standard likelihood ratio tests are not valid (STATA manual, release 
6, Volume 4, 1999).  The model also takes into account the complex survey design of the 
WERS sample, specifically the clustering of individuals in workplaces (I have yet to be 
granted access to the restricted data which would allow the samples stratification to be taken 
into account).  This is the correct procedure for analysis of WERS98 employee data, as set 
out in the WERS98 user guide (Forth and Kirby, 2000).  The full results for both models, 
including coefficients and robust standard errors are set out in table A1. 
 
 
2.  External Organising Effectiveness 
 
The estimation technique used was tobit analysis.  This reflects the fact that the dependent 
variable contained a large number of observations at the lower end clustered at 0 (Kennedy, 
1998:  pp. 250-251).   
 
Measuring Internal organising Effectiveness Using WERS98 
 
The weakness of using WERS98 for the purposes of this paper is that it does not allow us to 
link directly the appropriate union with the individual respondent.  The survey does ask 
individuals if they are union members, but it does not ask them of which union.  If there is 
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only one union present at the workplace, then it is highly likely that they will be a member of 
that union.  However, complications arise if there is more than one union present at the 
workplace.  One way around this problem would be to assume that employees in the largest 
occupational group are members of the largest union.  However this method has three faults.  
First, measurement error arises because the largest union may not organise the largest 
occupational group.  Second, measurement error arises because of difficulties in measuring 
the largest occupational group – there are two different measures, and results of our analyses 
differed significantly when each of the different measures was used.  The employee may also 
wrongly identify his or her own occupation, again causing measurement error.  Third, a full 
measure of internal organising effectiveness would include all individuals covered by the 
union, not just those in the largest occupational group.  For this reason, employees in single 
union workplaces, where these problems do not arise, were analysed separately.   
A way of looking at multi-union workplaces that gets around this problem is to use 
data from the employee representative questionnaire.  The employee representative 
interviewed is the most senior representative of the largest union.  We can therefore identify 
the union through the representative.  We can also identify the occupational group of the 
employee representative, so we can be fairly confident that employees in the same 
occupational group as the union rep will be eligible to be in the same union.  This gives a 
slightly limited measure of effectiveness in multi-union workplaces, but it is better than 
nothing.   
One major measurement problem remains.  Once again it is linked to the fact that only 
broad 1 digit occupational classifications are used.  There may be circumstance where 
individuals are in the same occupational group for classification purposes, but in practical 
terms do different occupations, so either are not covered by union membership (in single 
union workplaces) or are covered by a different union.  For example production line workers 
fall into the operative and assembly occupation, as do drivers.  The production line workers 
may be covered by collective bargaining, while the drivers are not.  However, this problem is 
likely to be randomly distributed, so the results should not be systematically biased.   
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Key to Union Acronyms 
 
AEU – Amalgamated Engineering Union (now merged to form AEEU) 
AEEU – Amalgamated Electrical and Engineering Union 
ALGUS – Alliance and Leicester Group Union of Staff 
ANSA – Abbey National Staff Association 
ASLEF – Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen 
ATL – Association of Teachers and Lecturers 
AUT – Association of University Teachers 
BACM – British Association of Colliery Management 
BALPA – British Airline Pilots Association 
BECTU – Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematography and Theatre Union 
BFAWU – Bakers, Food and Allied Workers Union 
BOS – British Orthoptic Society 
CSP – Chartered Society of Physiotherapy 
CWU – Communication Workers Union 
Connect – Formerly the Society of Telecom Executives 
EETPU – Electrical, electronic, telecommunications and plumbing union (now merged to 
form AEEU) 
EIS – Educational Institute of Scotland 
EMA – Engineers and Managers Association 
Equity – The Actors union 
FBU – Fire Brigades Union 
FDA – First Division Association (senior civil servants) 
GMB – Britain’s General Union 
GPMU – Graphical, Paper and Media Union 
IPMS – Institute of Professionals, Managers and Specialists 
ISTC – Iron and Steel Trades Confederation 
IUHS – Independent Union of Halifax Staffs 
KFAT – Knitwear, Footwear and Allied Trades 
MPO – Managerial and Professional Officers 
MSF – Manufacturing, Science and Finance 
MU – Musicians Union 
NACO – National Association of Co-operative Officials 
NATFHE – National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education 
NLBD – National League of Blind and Disabled 
NUDAGO – National Union of Domestic Appliances and General Operatives 
NUJ – National Union of Journalists 
NULMW – National Union of Lock and Metal Workers 
NUMAST – National Union of Marine, Aviation and Shipping Transport Officers 
NUPE – National Union of Public Employees (now merged to form UNISON) 
NUT – National Union of Teachers 
PCS – Public and Commercial Services Union  
PFA – Professional Footballers Association 
RMT – Rail, Maritime and Transport 
SoR – Society of Radiographers 
TGWU – Transport and General Workers Union 
TSSA –Transport Salaried Staffs Association 
UCATT- Union Constructions, Allied Trades and Technicians 
UNIFI – The Finance Union 
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UNISON – The Public Services Union 
USDAW – Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers 
WISA - Woolwich Independent Staff Association 
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Table A1 - Proportion of employees who are union members by union, workplace, 
individual and job characteristics 
 
                      Cell percentages 
Independent Variable Blue-collar employees   White collar employees   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Union        
AEEU 46.6 57.1 93 45.8 46.8 - 
UNISON 66.2 65.2 68.8 59.4 59.9 63 
TGWU 59.1 74.8 94.2 40.7 38.1 45.3 
GMB 52.7 67.8 91.8 30.4 48.3 78 
GPMU 52.7 83.1 85.5 28.9 34.3 - 
BIFU - - - 48.6 43.1 100 
USDAW 32.5 30.6 94.8 35.2 49.1 75.6 
RMT 87.1 87.7 79.9 - - - 
BFAWU 70.5 87.9 29.4 - - - 
CWU - - 90.3 - - - 
ISTC - - 100 - - - 
IPMS - - - 63.8 62.8 45 
AUT - - - 26.3 25.8 57.8 
PCS - - - 76.5 79.9 54.3 
MSF - - - 34.2 37.6 46 
NUT - - - 64.7 64.3 92.2 
NUIW - - - 71.2 58.8  
EIS - - - - - 87.6 
FBU - - - - - 96.2 
NATFHE 
 
- - - - - 56 
Local union behaviour       
Militant 96 96 92.9 53.5 58.2 73.4 
Cooperative 
 
72.6 78.5 93 58.3 61.4 71 
Local union organisation       
Senior union representative 
is elected  
68 71.2 91.8 55.7 61 71.2 
Senior union rep is 
appointed by management  
59 0 - 63.9 77.7 92.4 
Senior union rep is chosen 
by union 
51.3 49.4 88.7 58.5 53 61.2 
Senior rep volunteered 56.6 74 81.2 47.7 55.8 71.1 
No union representative 33.8 42.3 - 32.6 40.4 - 
Information on senior 
representatives mode of 
appointment missing 
 
68.9 50.2 - 49.8 51.3 - 
National union policy and 
structure 
      
Union’s score on NSU 
recruitment policy scale (no 
unions scored less than 5) 
      
5 - - - - - 80.7 
6 - - - - - 56 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
7 - - - - - - 
8 - - - 71.2 58.8 - 
9 - - - 26.3 25.8 63.3 
10 92.7 64.6 50.9 45.8 46.8 100 
11 94.8 30.6 32.5 35.6 46.9 89.8 
12 91.2 71.3 60 52.5 58.5 62.7 
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13 
 
85.5 83.1 70 60.8 59.7 56.7 
Union score on recruitment 
policy innovation scale 
      
0 71 38.2 42.7 37.9 48.4 90.9 
1 - - - 63.8 62.8 92.5 
2 - - - - - 59.5 
3 90.8 67.8 52.7 30.4 48.3 74.9 
4 - - - 71.2 58.8 - 
5 - - - - - 83.6 
6 - - - 75.2 77.5 54.6 
7 85.5 83.1 70 28.9 34.4 73.3 
8 94.2 73.8 59.1 40.7 37.2 45.3 
9 79.9 87.7 87.1 - - - 
10 93.3 57.1 46.6 34.9 38.5 46 
11 - - - - - 87.6 
12 
 
68.8 65.2 66.2 59.4 59.9 63 
Individual characteristics       
Age 16 - 20 24.8 35.9 63 11.3 14.4 87.8 
Age 20 – 24 37.5 22.4 87.4 21.6 30 50 
Age 25 – 29 52.2 63.9 94.8 40 46.1 71.9 
Age 30 – 39 56 71 92.2 51 56.6 72 
Age 40 - 49 55.4 71.9 94.1 59.2 66.3 77.2 
Age 50+ 
 
65.4 73.4 91.2 55.3 61.3 62.8 
Female  48.2 48.1 79.9 44.6 50.9 67.3 
Ethnic minority 
 
57.2 59.8 97 43.4 50.5 61.4 
Highest educational 
qualification  
      
None 58.9 68.6 91.5 53.5 59.3 69.8 
GCSE’s or equivalent  52.8 67.8 93.5 43.5 49.3 71.3 
A Levels or equivalent 48.3 57.6 84.6 42.7 54.2 60.5 
Degree or equivalent 
 
55.1 48.2 75.2 50 57.5 74.7 
Job characteristics       
Part-time (<30 hours/ week) 33.4 18.2 93 35.5 42.5 57.9 
Temporary or fixed term 
contract 
 
41.6 64.6 61 21.2 25 40.7 
Job tenure        
< 1 year 28.1 45.5 75.3 25.3 30.3 52 
1 – 2 years 33.9 41.8 92 27.9 36.7 52.2 
2 – 5 years 52.7 58.1 86.5 42.2 47.7 64.5 
5 – 10 years 60.9 74.1 95.4 56.4 64.7 77.9 
10+ years 
 
73.7 83 96.2 70 73.5 84.1 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Occupation        
Managerial and senior 
administrative 
- - - 59.4 67.4 75.8 
Professional - - - 55.5 59.5 75.1 
Associate professional and 
technical 
- - - 58 65.4 82.3 
Clerical and Administrative - - - 51.2 49 57 
Craft and related 66.1 74.7 90.6    
Personal services - - - 56.4 63.6 79.3 
Sales - - - 34.4 48.4 76 
Operative and assembly 55.6 70.4 92.6 - - - 
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Other unskilled manual 
 
41.7 40.6 89.8 - - - 
Workplace characteristics       
Workplace size        
10 – 24 employees 63.5 86.3 84.7 62.6 61.4 72.9 
25 – 99 employees 52.6 62 90.8 44.6 53.7 77.7 
100 – 499 employees 58.5 71.4 91.7 38.5 45.9 71.5 
500+ employees 
 
40.2 44.5 92.6 49.8 57.1 61.9 
Workplace age        
Workplace opened before 
1970 
62 67.7 93.5 47.3 56 73.5 
Workplace opened between 
1970 and 1979 
44.7 70.3 88.8 51 59.4 67.1 
Workplace opened between 
1980 and 1989 
55.1 75.1 90.2 48 49.2 67.4 
Workplace opened after 
1990 
52.8 64.2 85.8 37 42.7 71.1 
Product market 
competition  
      
No competitors 54.6 72.8 89.6 58.8 65.8 78.3 
Few competitors 48.3 57 91.6 46.7 61.3 76.7 
Many competitors 51.9 62.8 92.3 40.6 49.5 64.6 
Information on level of 
competition missing 
68 82.6 92.4 55.8 58.1 70.2 
Public sector 78.9 82.4 89.2 64.8 64.3 71.4 
Industry       
Manufacturing 54.3 61.9 92.8 27 36.7 - 
Electricity generation and 
supply, water and gas 
supply 
50 48.6 95.8 61.9 66.1 64 
Construction 57.5 57.7 84.9 46.4 45.3 100 
Wholesale and retail 43.7 52.6 89.1 35.6 49.4 75.6 
Hotels and restaurants  67 50 - 18.6 10.5 - 
Transport and 
communications 
79.8 89.6 90.6 28.2 45.3 73.3 
Financial services - - - 43.8 40.3 77.2 
Other business services 39.9 83.7  47.7 60.1 55 
Public administration 33.8 34.3 80 72 72.7 67.8 
Health and social services 45.5 54  61.1 64.1 77.6 
Other community services 69.3 80.1  43 42.7 32.4 
Education - - - 47.8 45 73.2 
Weighted base 1061 565 687 2304 1528 1404 
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Table A2 - Mean values of variables used in the analysis of internal organising 
effectiveness  
 
Independent Variable Blue-collar employees   White collar employees   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Union        
AEEU 0.114 0.092 0.279 0.006 0.009 - 
UNISON 0.066 0.066 0.003 0.308 0.406 0.154 
TGWU 0.291 0.313 0.36 0.032 0.017 0.015 
GMB 0.265 0.212 0.098 0.081 0.026 0.026 
GPMU 0.094 0.128 0.015 0.004 0.003 - 
BIFU - - - 0.066 0.778 0.009 
USDAW 0.114 0.138 0.025 0.335 0.271 0.013 
RMT 0.014 0.03 0.013 - - - 
BFAWU 0.042 0.021 0.014 - - - 
CWU - - 0.189 - - 0.034 
ISTC - - 0.003 - -  
IPMS - - - 0.005 0.008 - 
AUT - - - 0.002 0.003 0.013 
PCS - - - 0.06 0.068 0.174 
MSF - - - 0.085 0.094 0.015 
NUT - - - 0.009 0.014 0.181 
NUIW - - - 0.007 0.003 - 
EIS - - - - - 0.072 
FBU - - - - - 0.097 
NATFHE 
 
- - - - - 0.168 
Local union behaviour       
Militant 0.044 0.097 0.183 0.017 0.021 0.071 
Cooperative 
 
0.331 0.393 0.598 0.296 0.367 0.459 
Local union organisation       
Senior union 
representative is elected  
0.447 0.667 0.957 0.429 0.468 0.662 
Senior union 
representative appointed 
by management  
0.038 0.02 - 0.02 0.023 0.043 
Senior union rep chosen 
by union 
0.04 0.038 0.036 0.041 0.051 0.079 
Senior union rep 
volunteered 
0.12 0.147 0.007 0.134 0.16 0.205 
No union representative 0.297 0.083 - 0.341 0.258 - 
Information on senior 
representatives mode of 
appointment missing 
 
0.058 0.045 - 0.035 0.04 - 
Individual 
characteristics 
      
Age 16 - 20 0.051 0.055 0.03 0.086 0.05 0.004 
Age 20 – 24 0.067 0.056 0.042 0.082 0.065 0.041 
Age 25 – 29 0.097 0.107 0.101 0.13 0.128 0.11 
Age 30 – 39 0.286 0.314 0.308 0.296 0.312 0.305 
Age 40 - 49 0.217 0.216 0.267 0.238 0.246 0.345 
Age 50+ 
 
0.282 0.252 0.252 0.168 0.185 0.194 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 
Female  0.302 0.211 0.114 0.707 0.677 0.623 
Ethnic minority 0.031 0.025 0.037 0.035 0.041 0.043 
40 
Highest educational 
qualification  
      
None 0.454 0.403 0.515 0.169 0.153 0.063 
GCSE’s or equivalent  0.455 0.477 0.43 0.416 0.387 0.264 
A Levels or equivalent 0.074 0.083 0.074 0.211 0.203 0.147 
Degree or equivalent 
 
0.017 0.017 0.011 0.204 0.257 0.516 
Job characteristics       
Part-time (<30 hours/ 
week) 
0.163 0.134 0.054 0.436 0.379 0.3470. 
Temporary or fixed term 
contract 
 
0.066 0.056 0.045 0.057 0.061 0.151 
Job tenure        
< 1 year 0.159 0.141 0.085 0.162 0.159 0.115 
1 – 2 years 0.092 0.091 0.081 0.154 0.132 0.1 
2 – 5 years 0.214 0.217 0.14 0.246 0.219 0.228 
5 – 10 years 0.247 0.262 0.196 0.227 0.243 0.238 
10+ years 
 
0.288 0.289 0.498 0.211 0.247 0.319 
Occupation        
Managerial and senior 
administrative 
   0.065 0.062 0.003 
Professional    0.118 0.168 0.487 
Associate professional and 
technical 
   0.07 0.095 0.792 
Clerical and 
Administrative 
   0.3 0.35 0.267 
Craft and related 0.279 0.335 0.086 - - - 
Personal services    0.054 0.043 0.146 
Sales    0.392 0.283 0.017 
Operative and assembly 0.488 0.482 0.609 - - - 
Other unskilled manual 
 
0.233 0.183 0.205 - - - 
Workplace 
characteristics 
      
Workplace size        
10 – 24 employees 0.106 0.079 0.055 0.167 0.231 0.034 
25 – 99 employees 0.204 0.227 0.047 0.3 0.258 0.316 
100 – 499 employees 0.548 0.546 0.461 0.355 0.284 0.423 
500+ employees 
 
0.142 0.148 0.437 0.178 0.227 0.227 
Workplace age        
Workplace opened before 
1970 
0.601 0.583 0.658 0.212 0.232 0.598 
Workplace opened 
between 1970 and 1979 
0.204 0.152 0.229 0.323 0.387 0.208 
Workplace opened 
between 1980 and 1989 
0.273 0.294 0.025 0.225 0.215 0.105 
Workplace opened after 
1990 
 
 
0.122 0.137 0.088 0.24 0.166 0.089 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Product market 
competition  
      
No competitors 0.056 0.077 0.095 0.135 0.167 - 
Few competitors 0.337 0.388 0.372 0.199 0.17 - 
Many competitors 0.474 0.421 0.261 0.44 0.618 - 
Information on level of 0.133 0.114 0.272 0.226 0.245 - 
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competition missing 
 
Public sector 0.085 0.116 0.247 0.356 0.467 0.92 
Industry       
Manufacturing 0.537 0.467 0.649 0.013 0.006 - 
Electricity generation and 
supply, water and gas 
supply 
0.002 0.003 0.017 0.004 0.006 0.017 
Construction 0.025 0.038 0.052 0.018 0.029 0.002 
Wholesale and retail 0.178 0.209 0.012 0.417 0.307 0.013 
Hotels and restaurants  0.038 0.001 - 0.102 0.006 - 
Transport and 
communications 
0.109 0.182 0.254 0.012 0.006 0.017 
Financial services - - - 0.143 0.169 0.019 
Other business services 0.045 0.005 - 0.055 0.066 0.019 
Public administration 0.006 0.013 0.016 0.156 0.187 0.3 
Health and social services 0.025 0.025 - 0.107 0.132 0.105 
Other community services 0.035 0.057 - 0.04 0.051 0.007 
Education - - - 0.024 0.035 0.502 
Weighted base       
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Table A3 - Descriptive statistics for the NSU recruitment and organising policy and 
innovation scales 
 
 Mean  Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Recruitment policy scale     
Model 1 11.7 0.8 10 13 
Model 2 11.7 0.83 10 13 
Model 3 11.4 0.93 10 13 
Model 4 11.66 0.77 8 13 
Model 5 11.73 0.77 8 13 
Model 6 
 
10.44 2.54 5 13 
Recruitment innovation scale     
Model 1 5.84 3.68 0 12 
Model 2 6.03 3.63 0 12 
Model 3 6.83 3.08 0 12 
Model 4 5.54 5.3 0 12 
Model 5 6.59 5.4 0 12 
Model 6 
 
4.7 4.4 0 12 
Ratio of reps to employees     
Model 1 0.0153 0.0235 0 0.2 
Model 2 0.023 0.03 0 0.2 
Model 3 0.0264 0.0137 0.0033 0.1428 
Model 4 0.0104 0.0139 0 0.0714 
Model 5 0.0119 0.0145 0 0.0714 
Model 6 0.0282 0.0293 0 0.214 
 
 
43 
Table A4 - full regression results 
 
      
       
Independent variable Blue 
collar 
  White 
collar 
  
 Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Union (ref: TGWU – models 1 - 3 and UNISON – 
models 4 - 6) 
      
AEEU -
0.760
3 
(0.29)
*** 
 
-1.3759 
(0.66)** 
0.226 
(0.36) 
0.212 
(0.56) 
0.0315 
(0.55) 
- 
UNISON -
1.146
7 
(0.42)
*** 
 
-0.9473 
(0.6) 
- -  - 
GMB -
0.193
3 
(0.23) 
 
-1.446 
(0.42)*** 
0.3807 
(0.39) 
0.1726 
(0.43) 
0.1264 
(0.54) 
0.3334 
(0.54) 
TGWU - - - 0.8804 
(0.51)* 
 
0.2719 
(0.37) 
- 
GPMU -0.363 
(0.33) 
 
-0.5424 
(0.61) 
 0.043 
(0.43) 
-0.6433 
(0.43) 
- 
BIFU - -  0.8869 
(0.46)* 
 
0.7432 
(0.64) 
- 
USDAW -0.488 
(0.48) 
 
-0.6802 
(0.62) 
 0.371 
(0.46) 
0.7686 
(0.61) 
- 
RMT 0.469
9 
(0.67) 
 
-1.4036 
(0.8) 
   - 
BFAWU -
0.037
6 
(0.41) 
 
-0.615 
(0.72) 
   - 
CWU   -1.176 
(1.05) 
 
  - 
IPMS - -  0.0029 
(0.56) 
 
-0.2253 
(0.57) 
- 
AUT - -  -0.3469 
(0.27) 
 
-0.5806 
(0.41) 
- 
PCS - -  0.3665 
(0.21)* 
 
0.3059 
(0.2) 
1.029 
(0.34)*** 
MSF - -  0.0941 
(0.39) 
 
-0.1387 
(0.56) 
- 
NUT - -  0.9559 
(0.37)** 
 
0.8509 
(0.38)** 
1.1866 
(0.32)*** 
NUIW - -  0.7931 
(0.56) 
 
0.2889 
(0.76) 
- 
EIS      0.9932 
(0.33)*** 
 
NATFHE      0.3298 
(0.34) 
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FBU  
 
Model 
1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
 
 
Model 5 
2.9455 
(0.65) 
Model 6 
Other miscellaneous unions7   -1.16 
(0.54)** 
 
  0.3114 
(0.3) 
Local union behaviour (ref: No evidence of either co-
operation or militancy) 
      
Militancy8 
 
 
- - 0.7326 
(0.33)** 
0.2793 
(0.33) 
0.5157 
(0.34) 
0.6074 
(0.24)** 
Co-operation 0.703
6 
(0.19)
*** 
 
1.1475 
(0.27)*** 
0.4317 
(0.23)* 
0.3161 
(0.15)** 
0.2552 
(0.19) 
0.3461 
(0.14)** 
Local union organisation       
Senior union representative is elected (ref: no union 
representative models 1,2,4 and 5, ref: rep 
volunteered, models 3 and 6)) 
0.538
5 
(0.22)
** 
 
1.2039 
(0.47)** 
-0.311 
(0.65) 
0.7318 
(0.14)*** 
0.7195 
(0.15)*** 
0.324 
(0.2)* 
Senior union representative appointed by management  0.215
5 
(0.36) 
 
- - 1.001 
(0.32)*** 
1.271 
(0.47)*** 
1.4371 
(0.59)** 
Senior union rep is chosen by union -
0.385
1 
(0.44) 
 
-1.2031 
(0.99) 
-0.3475 
(0.82) 
0.585 
(0.26)** 
0.3257 
(0.26) 
0.2427 
(0.27) 
Senior union rep volunteered 0.447
7 
(0.29) 
 
0.2877 
(0.64) 
- 0.6113 
(0.21)*** 
0.5636 
(0.23)** 
- 
Information on senior representatives mode of 
selection missing 
0.531
3 
(0.27)
* 
 
2.5038 
(0.81)*** 
- -0.196 
(0.4) 
-0.3602 
(0.25) 
- 
Ratio of employees to representatives 
 
0.321
9 
(0.14)
** 
 
0.2879 
(0.17)* 
-0.1376 
(0.22) 
0.0176 
(0.09) 
-0.0047 
(0.08) 
0.1257 
(0.07)* 
Individual characteristics       
Age (ref Age under 20)       
Age 20 – 24 -
0.223
9 
(0.31) 
 
-0.6763 
(0.41)* 
0.4936 
(0.43) 
0.1198 
(0.2) 
0.1752 
(0.3) 
-1.284 
(0.55)** 
Age 25 – 29 -
0.048
9 
(0.29) 
 
-0.2405 
(0.38) 
0.7194 
(0.39)* 
0.4906 
(0.16)*** 
0.5901 
(0.24)** 
-0.8117 
(0.52) 
Age 30 – 39 0.129
3 
(0.28) 
 
0.0472 
(0.40) 
0.2491 
(0.43) 
0.6296 
(0.16)*** 
0.6837 
(0.24)*** 
-0.9307 
(0.53)* 
Age 40 - 49 0.056
2 
(0.27) 
 
0.0141 
(0.46) 
0.2196 
(0.48) 
0.7202 
(0.17)*** 
0.8008 
(0.25)*** 
-0.9646 
(0.53)* 
Age 50+ 0.271
1 
(0.31) 
 
0.2182 
(0.45) 
0.131 
(0.485) 
0.607 
(0.18)*** 
0.6946 
(0.26)** 
-1.1287 
(0.53)** 
                                                 
7 In model 3 this includes: In model 6 this includes: 
8 In models 1 and 2 militancy predicts success perfectly, in other words all employees in workplace where the 
union is militant are union members. 
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Female (ref: male) -
0.021
9 
(0.11) 
 
-0.0695 
(0.19) 
-0.9324 
(0.26)*** 
-0.0101 
(0.09) 
0.058 
(0.12) 
-0.1587 
(0.12) 
Ethnic minority 0.075
7 
(0.26) 
 
-0.1513 
(0.62) 
0.0406 
(0.5) 
-0.0515 
((0.29) 
-0.0265 
(0.35) 
-0.2378 
(0.16) 
Highest educational qualification (ref: none)       
GCSE’s or equivalent  -
0.029
2 
(0.14) 
 
0.2475 
(0.21)** 
0.2999 
(0.25) 
-0.0867 
(0.12) 
0.0599 
(0.16) 
-0.3188 
(0.22) 
A Levels or equivalent 0.153
2 
(0.25) 
 
0.138 
(0.38) 
0.0334 
(0.28) 
-0.2115 
(0.13) 
0.0022 
(0.17) 
-0.5573 
(0.23) 
Degree or equivalent -
0.700
2 
(0.38)
* 
 
-0.8861 
(0.59) 
-0.0927 
(0.37) 
-0.216 
(0.16) 
0.0499 
(0.21) 
-0.3778 
(0.23) 
 Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Job characteristics       
Part -time (<30 hours/ week) -
0.558
4 
(0.2)*
** 
 
 
-0.8673 
(0.35)** 
-0.528 
(0.31)* 
-0.3944 
(0.1)*** 
-0.5835 
(0.13)*** 
-0.397 
(0.12)*** 
Temporary or fixed term contract  0.336
5 
(0.18)
* 
 
0.7625 
(0.34)** 
-0.8714 
(0.28)*** 
-0.4745 
(0.19)** 
-0.4232 
(0.21)** 
-0.6478 
(0.15)*** 
Job tenure (ref: <1 year)       
1 – 2 years 0.052
5 
(0.3) 
 
-0.5185 
(0.34) 
-0.4087 
(0.29) 
0.0692 
(0.14) 
0.1633 
(0.16) 
-0.1536 
(0.21) 
2 – 5 years 0.626 
(0.18)
*** 
 
0.0559 
(0.28) 
-0.0499 
(0.46) 
0.4136 
(0.15)*** 
0.5409 
(0.15)*** 
0.2767 
(0.18) 
5 – 10 years 0.651
7 
(0.18)
*** 
0.3413 
(0.23) 
0.5966 
(0.38) 
0.5731 
(0.17)*** 
0.6956 
(0.14)*** 
0.5087 
(0.19)*** 
10+ years 
 
1.137 
(0.21)
*** 
 
0.5103 
(0.33) 
0.6456 
(0.34)* 
0.8325 
(0.18)*** 
0.86 
(0.21)*** 
0.8501 
(0.18)*** 
Occupation (ref: craft for models 1 – 3 and managers 
for models 4 – 6) 
      
Professional - 
 
 
- - -0.1533 
(0.22) 
-0.0456 
(0.31) 
2.1 
(0.62)*** 
Associate professional and technical - 
 
 
- - 0.3014 
(0.2) 
0.4091 
(0.27) 
2.81 
(0.62)*** 
Clerical and Administrative - 
 
 
- - -0.2251 
(0.2) 
-0.2527 
(0.29) 
1.8 
(0.67)*** 
Personal services - 
 
 
- - 0.0485 
(0.29) 
0.031 
(0.41) 
1.7118 
(0.55)*** 
Sales - 
 
 
- - -0.0753 
(0.29) 
0.16 
(0.5) 
2.4682 
(0.76)*** 
Operative and assembly -
0.332
0.0553 0.8434    
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0.332
6 
(0.19)
* 
(0.28) (0.39)** 
Other unskilled manual 
 
-
0.558
7 
(0.27)
** 
 
-0.4111 
(0.33) 
1.5985 
(0.78)** 
   
Workplace characteristics       
Workplace size (ref: 10 – 24 employees)        
25 – 99 employees -
0.194
8 
(0.27) 
 
0.2931 
(0.69) 
-0.219 
(0.81) 
-0.9153 
(0.19)*** 
-0.6745 
(0.2) 
0.0509 
(0.38) 
100 – 499 employees 0.021
3 
(0.27) 
 
0.1799 
(0.77) 
-0.0613 
(0.62) 
-1.21 
(0.19)*** 
-1.0268 
(0.2)*** 
-0.1512 
(0.4) 
500+ employees -
0.526
4 
(0.34) 
 
-1.6614 
(0.91)* 
0.306 
(0.67) 
-1.1832 
(0.2)*** 
-0.7438 
(0.22)*** 
-0.1894 
(0.45) 
Workplace age (ref: workplaces open before 1970)       
Workplace opened between 1970 and 1979 0.143
6 
(0.22) 
 
0.596 
(0.4) 
-0.5809 
(0.34)* 
-0.0425 
(0.14) 
0.0014 
(0.17) 
0.1497 
(0.15) 
Workplace opened between 1980 and 1989 0.131 
(0.19) 
 
-0.4218 
(0.34) 
-1.32 
(0.49)*** 
-0.0084 
(0.15) 
-0.1374 
(0.18) 
0.2566 
(0.19) 
Workplace opened after 1990 0.614 
(0.23)
*** 
 
0.6228 
(0.34)* 
-0.1418 
(0.41) 
0.2069 
(0.19) 
0.274 
(0.22) 
0.4256 
(0.2)** 
Product market competition (ref: many competitors)        
No competitors -
0.552
2 
(0.52) 
 
1.1728 
(0.6)* 
-1.3245 
(0.56)** 
-0.1729 
(0.19) 
-0.0323 
(0.22) 
0.0477 
(0.26 
 Model 
1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Few competitors -
0.030
2 
(0.18) 
 
-0.804 
(0.38)** 
-0.0019 
(0.28) 
0.5315 
(0.16)*** 
0.474 
(0.21)** 
0.2664 
(0.21) 
Information on level of competition missing 0.528
6 
(0.238
) 
 
1.064 
(0.48)** 
-0.2849 
(0.34) 
0.1198 
(0.17) 
0.1078 
(0.19) 
0.4422 
(0.21)** 
Public sector9 2.527
3 
(0.67)
*** 
 
- 0.9829 
(0.62) 
0.0828 
(0.25)*** 
0.7947 
(0.23)*** 
-0.1765 
(0.23) 
1 digit standard industrial classification (ref: 
manufacturing except model 6 where education is the 
reference) 
      
Electricity generation and supply, water and gas 
supply 
-
0.175
4 
(0.43) 
 
0.0046 
(0.97) 
1.9166 
(0.91)** 
1.7057 
(0.67)** 
1.268 
(0.85) 
0.4426 
(0.57) 
Construction 0.812
8 
(0.38)
** 
0.4161 
(0.74) 
-0.6215 
(0.68) 
0.9981 
(0.52)* 
0.034 
(0.61) 
 
                                                 
9 Public sector dummy is missing in model 3 because of collinearity with the Unison dummy.   
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** 
 
Wholesale and retail 0.502
1 
(0.29)
* 
 
0.44 
(0.55) 
0.6708 
(0.56) 
1.0669 
(0.5)** 
0.3556 
(0.62) 
0.928 
(0.52) 
Hotels and restaurants 0.292
6 
(0.43) 
 
-1.4589 
(0.48)*** 
- 0.2376 
(0.63) 
-1.099 
(0.62)* 
 
Transport and communications 0.299 
(0.27) 
 
-0.6994 
(0.53) 
0.2507 
(0.44) 
-0.0968 
(0.59) 
-0.4711 
(0.74) 
0.3008 
(0.47) 
Financial Services    0.8526 
(0.47)* 
 
0.2765 
(0.54) 
1.154 
(0.74) 
Other business services -
0.271
4 
(0.32) 
 
1.7247 
(0.87)** 
- 0.7316 
(0.44)* 
0.2379 
(0.56) 
-0.505 
(0.32) 
Public administration -
1.779
7 
(0.82)
** 
 
-0.3125 
(1.03) 
-0.6392 
(0.77) 
0.854 
(0.47)* 
0.173 
(0.59) 
-0.9437 
(0.41)** 
Health and social services -
1.124
6 
(0.75)
* 
 
0.2268 
(0.99) 
- 0.854 
(0.46)* 
0.38 
(0.59) 
0.1856 
(0.33) 
Other community services 0.358
6 
(0.35) 
1.8338 
(0.54)*** 
- 0.4446 
(0.5) 
 
-0.2538 
(0.67) 
-1.218 
(0.3)*** 
Education - - - -0.3756 
(0.52) 
 
0.915 
(0.69) 
 
Constant -
0.753
5 
(0.47) 
 
-0.225 
(0.99) 
0.4715 
(1.11) 
-1.8706 
(0.59) 
-1.7797 
(0.78) 
-1.2236 
(0.89) 
F 10.65 6.37 34.44 9.7 65.17 5.53 
Prob > F 0.000
0 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 936 
(147) 
463 (76) 654 (81) 2149 
(214) 
1432 
(134) 
1301 
(139) 
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Table A5 - new workers organised and number of new agreements by union 
organisational configuration and policy 
 
Organisational configuration Mean number organised/ 
number of members 
Mean number of 
agreements 
Commitment to recruitment 
scale 
  
0 0 0 
1 - - 
2 0 0 
3 0 0 
4 0 0 
5 0 0 
6 0 0 
7 0.00032 0.2 
8 0.0029 1 
9 0.0005 0.6 
10 0.0069 1.8 
11 - - 
12 0.054 9 
13 0.0013 6.67 
Recruitment innovation scale   
0 0.0096 1 
1 0.0025 1.5 
2 0.0003 0.167 
3 0.0012 3.5 
4 0.0086 3 
5 0 0 
6 0.0002 1 
7 0.059 4 
8 0.002 9.3 
9 0 0 
10 0.01 3.5 
11 0 0 
12 0.043 8 
13 - - 
Union policy   
Partnership  0.0069 4.78 
Organising 0.0066 3.13 
Organising and partnership 0.009 5.92 
Neither 0.0235 (0.0002) 0.3 (0.11)10 
 
                                                 
10 Figures in parentheses are discounting the IUHS, which is an outlier. 
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Table A6 - Descriptive statistics for variables used in the analysis regression analysis of 
external organising effectiveness 
 
 
 Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum n 
Number of agreements 
 
3.06 6 0 28 33 
Total organised divided by existing 
membership 
 
0.008 0.161 0 0.083 33 
Organising and recruitment scale 
 
9.26 2.9 2 13 33 
Innovation in organising and recruitment 
scale 
 
4.5 3.8 0 12 33 
Partnership 
 
0.47 0.5 0 1 33 
Organising 
 
0.75 0.44 0 1 33 
Interaction of partnership and organising 
 
0.33 0.47 0 1 33 
Size of union 
 
180,502 296,116 2253 1,272,330 33 
Latent demand 35.8 15.47 0 60 33 
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